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Abstract
We survey two generations of research on corporate governance systems around the
world, concentrating on countries other than the United States. The first generation of
international corporate governance research is patterned after the US research that
precedes it. These studies examine individual governance mechanisms – particularly
board composition and equity ownership – in individual countries. The second
generation of international corporate governance research considers the possible impact
of differing legal systems on the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance and
compares systems across countries.
We would like to thank David Denis, Mara Faccio, Karl Lins, Wayne Mikkelson, Paul
Malatesta, and participants in the Conference on Contemporary Corporate Governance
Issues II: International Corporate Governance for their comments on an earlier draft of
this survey. We also thank Orlin Dimitrov and David Offenberg for valuable research
assistance.

International Corporate Governance

I.

Introduction
Jensen and Meckling (1976) apply agency theory to the modern corporation and

model the agency costs of outside equity. In doing so, they formalize an idea that dates
back at least as far as Adam Smith (1776): when ownership and control of corporations
are not fully coincident, there is potential for conflicts of interest between owners and
controllers. There are also benefits to separating ownership and control; otherwise such a
structure is highly unlikely to have persisted as it has.1 The conflicts of interest, however,
combined with the inability to costlessly write perfect contracts or monitor the
controllers, ultimately reduce the value of the firm, ceteris paribus. These ideas form the
basis for research on corporate governance. How do entrepreneurs, shareholders, and
managers minimize the loss of value that results from the separation of ownership and
control?
The publication of Jensen and Meckling’s model spawned a voluminous body of
research, both theoretical and empirical. Through the 1970s and 1980s that research was
largely focused on the governance of US corporations, and US-based corporate
governance research continues to expand. By the early 1990s, however, research on
governance in countries other than the US began to appear. At first, that research focused
primarily on other major world economies, primarily Japan, Germany, and the United
Kingdom. More recent years, however, have witnessed an explosion of research on
corporate governance around the world, for both developed and emerging markets. The
result is an extensive and still growing body of research on international corporate
governance. Our task here is to survey that expanding body of literature.
We define corporate governance as the set of mechanisms – both institutional and
market-based – that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those that make
1

Individuals are not necessarily endowed with both managerial talent and financial capital. The ability to
separate ownership and control allows the holder of either type of endowment to earn a return on it. In
addition, the ability to raise capital from outside investors allows firms to take advantage of the benefits of
size, despite managerial wealth constraints or managerial risk aversion.
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decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make decisions that maximize
the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of capital). Or, to put it another
way:

“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to

corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” (Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), p. 737).
The governance mechanisms that have been most extensively studied in the US
can be broadly characterized as being either internal or external to the firm. The internal
mechanisms of primary interest are the board of directors and the equity ownership
structure of the firm. The primary external mechanisms are the external market for
corporate control (the takeover market) and the legal system.

A.

Internal Governance Mechanisms

A.1

Boards of Directors
Corporations in most countries of the world have boards of directors. In the US,

the board of directors is specifically charged with representing the interests of
shareholders.

The board exists primarily to hire, fire, monitor, and compensate

management, all with an eye towards maximizing shareholder value. While the board is
an effective corporate governance mechanism in theory, in practice its value is less clear.
Boards of directors in the US include some of the very insiders who are to be monitored;
in some cases they (or parties sympathetic to them) represent a majority of the board. In
addition, it is not uncommon that the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. Finally,
the nature of the selection process for board members is such that management often has
a strong hand in determining who the other members will be. The primary board-related
issues that have been studied in the US are board composition and executive
compensation.

Board composition characteristics of interest include the size and

structure of the board: the number of directors that comprise the board, the fraction of
these directors that are outsiders, and whether the CEO and chairperson positions are held
by the same individual. Executive compensation research is fundamentally concerned
with the degree to which managers are compensated in ways that align their interests with
those of their companies’ shareholders.
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A.2

Ownership Structure
Ownership and control are rarely completely separated within any firm. The

controllers frequently have some degree of ownership of the equity of the firms they
control; while some owners, by virtue of the size of their equity positions, effectively
have some control over the firms they own. Thus, ownership structure (i.e. the identities
of a firm’s equity holders and the sizes of their positions) is a potentially important
element of corporate governance.
It is reasonable to presume that greater overlap between ownership and control
should lead to a reduction in conflicts of interest and, therefore, to higher firm value. The
relationships between ownership, control, and firm value are more complicated than that,
however. Ownership by a company’s management, for example, can serve to better align
managers’ interests with those of the company’s shareholders. However, to the extent
that managers’ and shareholders’ interests are not fully aligned, higher equity ownership
can provide managers with greater freedom to pursue their own objectives without fear of
reprisal; i.e. it can entrench managers. Thus, the ultimate effect of managerial ownership
on firm value depends upon the trade-off between the alignment and entrenchment
effects.
Shareholders other than management can potentially influence the actions taken
by management. The problem in the typical US corporation, with its widely-dispersed
share ownership, is that individual shareholders own very small fractions of an individual
firm’s shares and, therefore, have little or no incentive to expend significant resources to
monitor managers or seek to influence decision-making within the firm. Moreover, the
free-rider problem reduces the incentives for these disparate shareholders to coordinate
their actions. However, individual shareholders who have more significant ownership
positions have greater incentives to expend resources to monitor and influence managers.
As with ownership by managers, ownership by outside blockholders is not an
unequivocally positive force from the perspective of the other shareholders.
Blockholders can use their influence such that management is more likely to make
decisions that increase overall shareholder value.

These are the shared benefits of

control; i.e. blockholders exercise them but all shareholders benefit from them. However,
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there are private benefits of control as well – benefits available only to blockholders.
These private benefits can be innocuous from the perspective of other shareholders; e.g. a
blockholder may simply enjoy the access to powerful people that comes from being a
major shareholder.

However, if blockholders use their control to extract corporate

resources, the private benefits they receive will lead to reductions in the value of the firm
to the other shareholders.

Thus, the ultimate effect of blockholder ownership on

measured firm value depends upon the trade-off between the shared benefits of
blockholder control and any private extraction of firm value by blockholders.
In many countries of the world, the government is a significant owner of
corporations. Government ownership represents an interesting hybrid of dispersed and
concentrated ownership. If we view the government as a single entity, state-owned
corporations have very concentrated ownership. Unlike private blockholders, however,
government ownership is funded with money that ultimately belongs to the state as a
whole and not to the individuals within the government that influence the actions of the
firm. In this regard, the ultimate ownership of state-owned companies is, in fact, quite
dispersed. Over time, there has been a trend away from state ownership of corporate
assets. The conversion from state to private ownership, termed privatization, provides an
interesting setting in which to examine the effects of ownership on firm performance.

B.

External Governance Mechanisms

B.1

The Takeover Market
When internal control mechanisms fail to a large enough degree – i.e.when the

gap between the actual value of a firm and its potential value is sufficiently large - there
is incentive for outside parties to seek control of the firm. The market for corporate
control in the US has been very active, as have researchers interested in this market.
Changes in the control of firms virtually always occur at a premium, thereby creating
value for the target firm’s shareholders. Furthermore, the mere threat of a change in
control can provide management with incentives to keep firm value high, so that the
value gap is not large enough to warrant an attack from the outside. Thus, the takeover
market has been an important governance mechanism in the US.
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As with other potential corporate governance mechanisms, however, the takeover
market has its dark side for shareholders. In addition to being a potential solution to the
manager/shareholder agency problem, it can be a manifestation of this problem.
Managers interested in maximizing the size of their business empires can waste corporate
resources by overpaying for acquisitions rather than returning cash to the shareholders.

B.2

The Legal System
The literature that we term first-generation international corporate governance

research, and which we survey in section II, is largely patterned after the existing US
studies. Individual first-generation studies generally focus on board structure, executive
compensation, equity ownership, or external control mechanisms. The typical individual
study examines one (or a small number) of non-US countries.

This generation of

international corporate governance research, and the US research on which it is patterned,
is important and informative. However, it pays only scant attention to another external
corporate governance mechanism, the legal system. Jensen (1993) acknowledges the
legal system as a corporate governance mechanism but characterizes it as being too blunt
an instrument to deal effectively with the agency problems between managers and
shareholders. Practically speaking, studies that examine evidence from a single country
provide little scope for studying the effects of legal systems, as all of the firms in such a
sample are subject to the same national legal regime.
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) hypothesize that the legal
system is a fundamentally important corporate governance mechanism. In particular,
they argue that the extent to which a country’s laws protect investor rights and the extent
to which those laws are enforced are the most basic determinants of the ways in which
corporate finance and corporate governance evolve in that country. This basic idea has
spawned a growing body of research that examines differing legal regimes across
countries.
governance.

Such research allows for meaningful comparative studies of corporate
Given the interrelationships among the various corporate governance

mechanisms, it also has the potential to provide a more complete understanding of the
roles of firm-specific corporate governance mechanisms such as the board of directors
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and equity ownership.

We term this line of research the second generation of

international corporate governance research and survey it in section III.
Comparisons of differing systems of corporate governance inevitably lead to
certain obvious questions. Is there one ‘right’ system of corporate governance? If so,
what are the characteristics of that system and are we observing convergence towards it?
If there is not one right system of governance, what characteristics of countries or
companies determine which systems are optimal for them? Several authors have tackled
these important questions and we review their ideas and ours in section IV. Section V
concludes.
Having indicated what we do in this paper, it is incumbent upon us to point out
what we do not do. Because numerous excellent surveys of the extensive US literature
on corporate governance have been written over the years, we do not survey that
literature here.2 We do, however, briefly review certain papers and subject areas from the
US literature to help frame and interpret the international evidence that we present.
Equity holders, of course, are not the only suppliers of capital to corporations and
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also model the agency conflicts between shareholders and
debtholders. Other than to acknowledge its existence, we do not deal with that particular
agency relationship in this survey.
Finally, the traditional caveat for survey papers applies to this one as well. It
would not be possible to give due consideration to all of the many excellent papers that
have been written in the area of international corporate governance. The global scope of
the topic makes this more true than usual: there are undoubtedly good papers written in
languages other than English or published in outlets with which we are not familiar. We
apologize in advance to the authors of each paper omitted. We have tried, however, to
cover a broad spectrum of papers and the major topics in a way that will provide a
representative view of what the literature has to say about international corporate
governance.

2

See, for example, Denis (2001) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) on general corporate governance; John
and Senbet (1998) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2002) on boards of directors; Core, Guay, and Larcker
(2001) and Murphy (1999) on executive compensation; Holderness (2002) on blockholders; Holmstrom
and Kaplan (2001) on merger activity; and Karpoff (1998) on shareholder activism.
6

II.

First Generation International Corporate Governance
Research
The international corporate governance research that we label first generation is

patterned after a large body of US research. In this section, we review the international
evidence on internal control mechanisms, in particular the board of directors and equity
ownership structure, and on the external market for corporate control.
The first generation of research on corporate governance mechanisms generally
concerns itself with two questions regarding a particular mechanism. First, does that
mechanism affect firm performance, where performance is typically measured by
profitability or relative market value? Second, does that mechanism affect the particular
decisions made by firms; for example with respect to such issues as management
turnover and replacement, investment policy, and reactions to outside offers for control?

A. Boards of Directors
A.1.

Board Composition
In the US, the board of directors is charged with representing shareholders’

interests. As such, it is the official first line of defense against managers who would act
contrary to shareholders’ interests.

A considerable body of evidence addresses the

effectiveness with which US boards protect shareholders’ interests.

Hermalin and

Weisbach (2002) review this literature.
The board characteristics that have been most extensively studied are the relative
proportion of outside directors and the size of the board.

Hermalin and Weisbach

summarize the US evidence as follows: (1) Higher proportions of outside directors are
not associated with superior firm performance, but are associated with better decisions
concerning such issues as acquisitions, executive compensation, and CEO turnover. (2)
Board size is negatively related to both general firm performance and the quality of
decision-making. (3) Poor firm performance, CEO turnover, and changes in ownership
structure are often associated with changes in the membership of the board.

7

The earliest non-US evidence on boards of directors comes from Japan. Kaplan
and Minton (1994) examine the effectiveness of boards of directors in the Japanese
system.

In particular, they concentrate on the appointment of outside directors to

Japanese boards, where outside directors are defined as individuals previously employed
by banks or other nonfinancial corporations. They find that such appointments increase
following poor stock performance and earnings losses, and that they are more likely in
firms with significant bank borrowings, concentrated shareholders, and membership in a
corporate group.

As evidence that such outside directors are effective corporate

governance mechanisms, Kaplan and Minton show that, on average, such appointments
stabilize and modestly improve corporate performance, measured using stock returns,
operating performance, and sales growth.
Wymeersch (1998) details extensively the makeup of European boards of
directors. He reports that, in most European states, the role of the board of directors has
not been prescribed in law.

Thus, in many European countries shareholder wealth

maximization has not been the only – or even necessarily the primary – goal of the board
of directors. This varies across countries, with the British, Swiss, and Belgian systems
being the most focused on shareholder welfare.
Boards of directors in Europe are most often unitary, as in the US. In some
European countries, however, boards are two-tiered. A two-tiered structure is mandatory
in some countries, e.g. Germany and Austria, and optional in others, e.g. France and
Finland. Two-tier boards generally consist of a managing board, composed of executives
of the firm, and a supervisory board. In Germany, representation of employees on the
supervisory board, termed co-determination, is mandatory.
Until recently there have been few published papers that study the effectiveness of
European boards of directors. Despite this lack of evidence, and despite the fact that the
US evidence is somewhat open-ended regarding the effect of board characteristics on
firm value, various European commissions have embraced the idea that appropriate board
composition is important to good corporate governance. Codes of Best Practice have
been issued in a number of European countries, starting with the UK in 1992. Common
to most of these codes is a requirement for specified numbers or percentages of
independent directors on the boards of firms in the country. The codes are typically
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voluntary in nature and the degree of compliance with them varies across countries.
Wymeersch (1998) hypothesizes that compliance is more difficult on the continent than
in the UK, due to the greater presence there of controlling shareholders who do not wish
to see their influence reduced by the addition of independent directors to their companies’
boards.
Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002) address the effect on board effectiveness
of the UK Code of Best Practice, put forth by the Cadbury Committee. Among other
things, the Code recommends that boards of UK corporations include at least three
outside directors and that the positions of chairperson and CEO be held by different
individuals. While the Code is voluntary (as of the writing of this paper), the London
Stock Exchange does require that all listed companies explicitly indicate whether they are
in compliance with the Code. If a company is not in compliance, an explanation is
required as to why it is not.
Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos document that CEO turnover increased following
issuance of the Code and that the sensitivity of turnover to performance is stronger
following its issuance. These increases are concentrated among those firms that chose to
adopt the Code. They further conclude that it is the increase in the fraction of outsiders
on the board, rather than the separation of the Chairperson and CEO positions, that
explains the turnovers. These results are consistent with the findings of Weisbach (1988)
for US firms, but inconsistent with the evidence reported by Kang and Shivdasani (1995),
who are unable to document a definitive relation between the presence of outside
directors and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance for Japanese firms. Franks,
Mayer, and Renneboog (2001) examine a sample of poorly-performing firms in the UK
and find that boards dominated by outside directors actually impede discipline of poorlyperforming managers.
Dahya and McConnell (2002) examine the effect of the UK’s Code on
appointments of new CEOs. They report that a firm’s board is more likely to appoint an
outside CEO after the firm has increased the representation of outside directors to comply
with the Code. This result is consistent with the findings of Borokhovich, Parrino, and
Trapani (1996) for the US. Based upon an event study of stock prices, Dahya and
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McConnell also report that appointment of an outside CEO is good news for
shareholders.
As stated earlier, some Codes of Best Practice specify that the Chairperson and
CEO positions should be held by different individuals.

There is relatively limited

evidence on whether such a separation influences governance effectiveness.

That

evidence generally indicates that separating the two positions has no significant effect;
i.e. it does not result in better firm performance or in better decision-making by firms.
(See, for example, Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) for the US and Vafeas and
Theodorou (1998) for the UK.)
Evidence regarding the effectiveness of boards of directors elsewhere in the world
is scattered. Blasi and Shleifer (1996) examine board structure in Russia in 1992/1993
and then again in 1994. They report that most firms are majority-owned by insiders and
employees and that the boards are solidly controlled by insiders. Most managers indicate
resistance to outsiders on the board.

Those board members that are outsiders are

typically blockholders. Blasi and Shleifer note that a government decree urging that
boards be composed of no more than 1/3 insiders has been ignored by all but a very few
small Russian companies.
Hossain, Prevost, and Rao (2001) examine the relation between firm performance
and the presence of outside directors in New Zealand firms both before and after the 1994
Companies Act.

This Act was issued in 1994 with the intention of enhancing the

performance of New Zealand firms through better monitoring by boards.

Hossain,

Prevost, and Rao find a positive relation; i.e. a higher fraction of outside directors leads to
better performance. However, they find no evidence that the strength of that relation was
affected by the Companies Act.

Rodriguez and Anson (2001) examine the market

reaction to announcements by Spanish firms that they will comply with the Spanish Code
of Best Practice, which contains 23 recommendations that aim to strengthen the
supervisory role of Spanish boards of directors. Rodriguez and Anson report that the
stock prices react positively to announcements of compliance when such announcements
imply a major restructuring of the board; this reaction is stronger for firms that have been
performing poorly.
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Consistent with the findings for the US, there is some evidence that boards with
more outside directors in other countries are more likely to dismiss top management.
Suchard, Singh, and Barr (2001) find that the incidence of top management turnover in
Australia is positively related to the presence of non-executive directors on the board.
Renneboog (2000) documents a similar result for firms listed on the Brussels Stock
Exchange.
Also consistent with US evidence, there is some evidence of a negative relation
between board size and firm performance in several non-US countries. Mak and Yuanto
(2002) find evidence of an inverse relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q in
Singapore and Malaysia, while Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) document an
inverse relation between board size and profitability for small and midsize companies in
Finland. Carline, Linn, and Yadav (2002) find that board size is negatively related to
operating performance improvements following UK mergers.

A.2.

Executive Compensation
Among the tasks specifically assigned to the board of directors is that of

determining the structure and level of compensation of the top executives of the firm.
Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2001) survey the existing evidence on
executive compensation in the US. The compensation issue that is of greatest interest
from a corporate governance perspective is the degree to which executive compensation
aligns top executives’ interests with those of their shareholders; i.e. the sensitivity of
executive pay to performance. The US research surveyed by Murphy and by Core, Guay,
and Larcker supports several broad conclusions.
performance in the US has increased over time.

First, the sensitivity of pay to
Second, the vast majority of this

sensitivity comes through executive ownership of common stock and of options on
common stock.

Finally, stock options are the fastest growing component of CEO

compensation in the US.
The non-US evidence on executive compensation has been relatively limited.
Kaplan (1994) studies executive compensation in the US and Japan. He concludes that
top executive compensation in both countries is related to stock returns and to earnings
losses. The magnitude of that relation is quite similar in the two countries, though
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Kaplan points out that US managers own more stock and stock options than do Japanese
managers. Conyon and Murphy (2000) compare executive compensation in the US and
the UK.

They find that the level of cash compensation and the sensitivity of

compensation to increases in shareholder wealth are much greater in the US than in the
UK and attribute the difference largely to greater share option awards in the US.
Evidence on compensation has more recently expanded to include a greater
number of countries.

Crespi, Gispert, and Renneboog (2002) study executive

compensation in Spain and find some evidence of increased pay following increases in
industry-adjusted stock price performance.

This sensitivity of pay to performance,

however, holds only in the subset of firms that have strong blockholders. Bryan, Nash,
and Patel (2002) investigate the relative use of equity in the compensation mixes of firms
in 43 different countries. They find that firms in countries with more equity-oriented
capital markets and firms with higher growth opportunities use more equity
compensation.
Overall, the empirical evidence on board structure and executive compensation
around the world supports the more extensive US evidence. Smaller boards of directors
are associated with better firm performance. The presence of outsiders on boards of
directors does not affect the ongoing performance of the firm, on average, but does
sometimes affect decisions about important issues. Codes of Best Practice that have been
issued in many countries around the world generally seek to move boards towards greater
representation by outside directors. The evidence to date on the effects of compliance
with these Codes tentatively hints that having more outside directors alters board
decisions within some, but not all, countries studied. The limited non-US evidence on
executive compensation indicates that, to varying degrees, pay is sensitive to
performance.
For many countries in the world there is only limited empirical evidence
regarding issues related to the effectiveness of boards of directors and of the
compensation plans they put in place; for some there is no evidence at all. These are
useful avenues for further research.

In addition, boards of directors and executive

compensation cannot be viewed in isolation.
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The interrelationship between board

composition, executive compensation, and other corporate governance mechanisms
remains a fruitful area for research worldwide.

B. Ownership and Control
Early corporate governance research in the US centered on the idea that
corporations are owned by widely-dispersed shareholders and are controlled by
professional managers who own little or none of the equity of the firms they manage.
Beginning in the late 1980s, however, research emerged that recognized that many US
corporations do, in fact, have significant equity ownership by insiders or shareholders
that own significant blocks of equity. Holderness (2002) surveys the US evidence on
equity ownership by insiders and blockholders, where insiders are defined as the officers
and directors of a firm and a blockholder is any entity that owns at least 5% of the firm’s
equity. He reports that average inside ownership in publicly-traded US corporations is
approximately 20%, varying from almost none in some firms to majority ownership by
insiders in others. Mehran (1995) reports that 56% of the firms in a sample of randomly
selected manufacturing firms have outside blockholders.
Holderness (2002) also surveys the US literature that examines the effects of
insider and blockholder equity ownership on corporate decisions and on firm value.
Recall from the introduction that there are opposing hypotheses about these effects.
Equity ownership by insiders can align insiders’ interests with those of the other
shareholders, thereby leading to better decisions or higher firm value. However, higher
ownership by insiders may result in a greater degree of managerial control, potentially
entrenching managers. Similarly, the greater control that blockholders have by virtue of
their equity ownership positions may lead them to take actions that increase the market
value of the firm’s shares, benefiting all shareholders. However, that same control can
provide blockholders with private benefits, i.e., benefits that are not available to other
shareholders. The private benefits enjoyed by blockholders potentially reduce observed
firm value.
The US evidence regarding the effects of ownership structure on corporate
decisions and on firm value is mixed.

Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and
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McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that the alignment effects of inside ownership
dominate the entrenchment effects over some ranges of managerial ownership. However,
as inside ownership increases beyond some level, the entrenchment effects of inside
ownership dominate and higher inside ownership is associated with lower firm value. In
contrast, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) use panel data and conclude that a large
fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is endogenous. They
suggest that managerial ownership and firm performance are determined by a common
set of characteristics and, therefore, question the causal link from ownership to
performance implied by the above-mentioned studies.
Holderness (2002) indicates that there have been few direct attempts to separately
measure the impact of outside (i.e. non-management) blockholders on firm value.
Mehran (1995) finds no significant relations between firm performance and the holdings
of a variety of different types of blockholders, including individuals, institutions, and
corporations. There is, however, some evidence that the formation of a new block or the
trade of an existing block are met with abnormal stock price increases. (See Mikkelson
and Ruback (1985) and Barclay and Holderness (1991, 1992).) Overall, Holderness
(2002) concludes that the body of evidence on the relation between blockholders and firm
value in the US indicates that the relation is sometimes negative, sometimes positive, and
never very pronounced.
While there is little strong evidence that blockholders affect the observed market
value of firms, the US evidence does indicate that blockholders can enjoy significant
private benefits of control. A number of studies document that block trades are typically
priced at a premium to the exchange price, consistent with blockholders expecting
benefits that are not available to other shareholders. (See Barclay and Holderness (1989),
Mikkelson and Regassa (1991), and Chang and Mayers (1995).) The extent to which
such private benefits lead to reductions in firm value remains an open question.

B.1. Ownership Concentration Around the World
Of the various corporate governance mechanisms that have been studied in the
US, ownership structure is the mechanism that has been studied most extensively in the
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rest of the world. As with other aspects of corporate governance, the early non-US
evidence on ownership focused on Japan, Germany, and the UK.
Equity ownership in the UK has historically been much like that in the US. There
are large numbers of publicly-traded firms, most of which are relatively widely-held.
Equity ownership in Germany has historically been more concentrated than in the US. In
addition, banks play more important governance roles in Germany and Japan. These
distinctions led researchers to distinguish between market-centered economies (US and
UK) and bank-centered economies (Germany and Japan).
Despite both being considered bank-centered economies, there are differences
between the structure of equity ownership in Germany and Japan.

Prowse (1992)

indicates that financial institutions are the most important blockholders in Japan. It has
been a common perception that the same is true in Germany; however, Franks and Mayer
(2001) find that other companies are the most prevalent blockholders in Germany,
followed by families. German banks do, however, have more voting power than their
equity ownership would suggest by virtue of the fact that they vote the proxies of many
individual shareholders. Thus, financial institutions have significant amounts of control
over firms in both Germany and Japan.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, studies of equity ownership concentration expanded
to include countries others than the ‘big four’. This body of evidence reveals that
concentrated ownership structures are more typical of ownership structures around the
world than are the relatively diffuse structures observed in large, publicly-traded US and
UK firms.3 This generalization, however, masks important differences across countries
with respect to the degree of ownership concentration and the identities of the
blockholders.
Faccio and Lang (2002) examine western European countries and conclude that
listed firms are generally either widely-held, which is more common in the UK and
Ireland, or family-owned, which is more common in continental Europe. Blass, Yafeh,
3

Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003, this volume) present evidence that the existence of
concentrated ownership of firms around the world explains some of the well-known home bias in equity
ownership. Home bias refers to the overweighting of domestic stocks in investors’ portfolios. This bias
has typically been calculated utilizing a world market portfolio. Dahlquist et al argue that large portions of
the equity of firms with concentrated ownership structures are effectively unavailable to foreign investors
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and Yosha (1998) document high ownership concentration in Israel, with banks and
affiliated institutional investors as the most significant non-insider holders. Xu and
Wang (1997) document high ownership concentration in China, with ownership split
relatively equally between the government, institutions, and domestic individuals.
Valadares and Leal (2000) document high ownership concentration in Brazil; with the
majority of blockholders being corporations or individuals.
Numerous non-US studies address the relation between ownership structure and
firm performance.

Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that Japanese firms with

blockholders restructure more quickly following performance declines than do Japanese
firms without blockholders. They point out, however, that the response comes less
quickly in Japan than in the US.

Gorton and Schmid (2000) document that firm

performance in Germany is positively related to concentrated equity ownership. Kaplan
(1994), however, finds no relation between ownership structure and management
turnover in Germany. Claessens and Djankov (1999) study Czech firms and report that
firm profitability and labor productivity are both positively related to ownership
concentration.
There are numerous potential types of large shareholders – other corporations,
institutions, families, and government – and the evidence implies that the relation
between large shareholders and value often depends on who the large shareholders are.
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1998), for example, examine firms in nine East
Asian countries and find that the impact of ownership varies according to the identity of
the blockholder. Ownership by corporations is negatively related to performance, while
ownership by the government is positively associated with performance. They find no
relation between institutional ownership and firm performance.

Gibson (2003, this

volume) studies firms in eight emerging market countries and reports that, while CEO
turnover is more likely for poorly-performing firms in the sample overall, there is no
relation between CEO turnover and firm performance for the subset of firms that have a
large domestic shareholder.

interested only in portfolio diversification. The world market portfolio therefore overstates the amount of
foreign stock available and, thus, overstates the extent of the observed home bias.
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The effects on value of ownership by management have been of particular interest
in international research. With respect to inside ownership in the UK, Short and Keasey
(1999) document that the entrenchment effects of managerial ownership begin to
dominate the alignment effects when management ownership is 12%. Because Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that entrenchment dominates alignment beginning at 5%
managerial ownerhship, Short and Keasey conclude that managers become entrenched at
higher levels of equity ownership in the UK than in the US. They attribute this to better
coordination of monitoring by UK institutions and less ability of UK managers to mount
takeover defenses. Miguel, Pindado, and de la Torre (2001) document a similar nonlinear
relation between inside ownership and firm value in Spain. Carline, Linn, and Yadav
(2002) find that managerial ownership has a positive impact on performance
improvements following UK mergers. Claessens and Djankov (1998a) find for Czech
firms that managerial equity holdings have no effect on performance. However, they do
show that firm performance improves with the appointment of new managers,
particularly if the managers are chosen by private owners rather than by the government.
Craswell, Taylor, and Saywell (1997) document only a weak curvilinear relation between
inside ownership and performance in Australia; the relation is unstable across time and
inconsistent over firm-size groups.
Less direct evidence on the relation between inside ownership and firm
performance comes from studies of diversified firms. A large body of US evidence
documents a diversification discount; i.e. diversified firms are worth less than the sum of
the stand-alone value of the separate pieces of the firm. (See, for example, Lang and
Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996).)4 Lins and Servaes (1999)
measure the relation between concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders and the
value of diversification for firms in Germany, Japan, and the UK. They find that inside
owners have a positive effect on the value of diversification in Germany, but not in the
UK or Japan.

Chen and Ho (2000) study firms in Singapore and document that

4

Several recent studies question whether the diversification discount is caused by diversification per se.
(See, for example, Campa and Kedia (2002), Chevalier (2000), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2001),
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), and Whited (2001).) There is, however, little disagreement about the fact
that the average diversified firm is valued less than a similar group of stand-alone firms.
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diversification has a negative effect on value only in firms with low managerial
ownership.5
We indicated earlier that some governance researchers dichotimize economies
into those that are market-centered and those that are bank-centered. Numerous studies
address the impact of bank involvement on firm value.

Morck, Nakamura, and

Shivdasani (2000) find that the relation between bank ownership and firm performance in
Japan varies over the ownership spectrum; in particular, the relation is more positive
when ownership is high. Gorton and Schmid (2000) report that the positive relation
between ownership concentration and firm value for German firms is particularly strong
where there is block ownership by banks. Xu and Wang (1997) document an overall
positive relation between ownership concentration and profitability in Chinese firms; this
relation is stronger when blockholders are financial institutions than when it is the state
that is the primary blockholder.

Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) find that block equity

ownership by lending institutions is positively correlated with firm performance in India.
Blass, Yafeh, and Yosha (1998) report that banks are significant blockholders in Israel.
They conclude, however, that the benefits that the powerful role of banks have for
shareholders are outweighed by the costs, e.g. the lack of an external control market.
The evidence from around the world indicates that the relation between ownership
structure and firm performance varies – both by country and by blockholder identity.
Overall, however, this body of evidence suggests that there is a more significant relation
between ownership structure and firm performance in non-US firms than there is in US
firms. Concentrated ownership most often has a positive effect on firm value. The
important role that banks play in governance in non-US countries is particularly
interesting given that US banks are prohibited from taking a large role in governing US
firms.

An interesting question is whether such prohibitions interfere with optimal

governance for US firms – or whether other aspects of US governance reduce the
potential value of bank involvement.

5

These results contrast somewhat with those of Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) for the US. Denis, Denis,
and Sarin find that firms with high inside ownership are less likely to diversify. Conditional on
diversifying, however, the valuation effects of diversification are unrelated to inside ownership.
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B.2. Ownership Change Via Privatization
The ownership studies reviewed above are primarily cross-sectional in nature.
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance can also be
evaluated by examining firms that undergo a discrete change in ownership. A relatively
dramatic example of such a change occurs when a previously state-owned firm is
privatized, undergoing a relatively rapid transition from ownership by the government to
ownership by private entities.

Beginning in earnest in the early 1980s in Britain,

privatizations have spread around the world, generating increasing amounts of revenue
for the governments involved over the past two decades.
Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an exhaustive review of over 225 studies
regarding various economic aspects of the myriad issues surrounding privatization. We
do not propose to replicate that effort here and instead refer the interested reader to
Megginson and Netter’s excellent survey. We focus on a small subset of these studies as
well as some studies not included in that survey in order to highlight the privatization
findings that we consider most relevant to our survey.
The primary governance-related question addressed in the empirical privatization
literature is whether firm performance increases when firms become privately owned.
Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994) examine 61 state-owned companies
from 18 countries that were privatized over the period 1979 – 1990. They report that, on
average, privatized firms experience an increase in profitability, an increase in efficiency
(measured as cost reduction per unit of production), and an increase in work force
employed from before to after privatization. Boubakri and Cosset (1998) focus on
privatizations in developing countries. They compare 79 partially or fully privatized
firms in 21 developing countries to various benchmarks and report significant relative
increases in profitability, operating efficiency, employment levels, and dividends
following privatization.
LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) study 218 Mexican firms from a wide
spectrum of industries that were privatized over the period 1983–1991. They document a
significant increase in profitability for these firms, due primarily to reductions in
employment and the associated reduction in labor costs. Claessens and Djankov (1998b)
conduct a large scale analysis of 6,354 newly-privatized firms from seven Eastern
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European countries for the period 1992-1995. Many of these firms became private by
means of mass privatization schemes that transformed major sections of the Eastern
European economy during the early 1990s. Using multivariate analysis, they conclude
that privatization is associated with greater productivity and higher productivity growth.
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) examine the relation between state ownership and
performance cross-sectionally and over time. They look at Fortune magazine’s largest
industrial firms outside the US for the years 1975, 1985 and 1995; a sample which
includes firms that are privately-owned and firms that are state-owned. After controlling
for other factors, they report that state-owned firms are significantly less profitable than
privately–owned firms.

State-owned firms also exhibit significantly greater labor

intensity, as measured by employee to sales ratio. They observe, however, that the higher
profits are not directly linked to privatization. Rather, the increase in profits seems to
occur immediately prior to privatization. Thus, it is possible that governments choose to
privatize firms that have become profitable.

Alternatively, the prospect of future

privatization may prod the company to improve performance.
The studies above represent a larger number of studies that address the effects of
state versus private ownership on performance. Overall, the existing body of evidence
implies that private ownership is associated with better firm performance than is state
ownership. Also relevant to this survey are the related questions of whether the identity
of the new owners and the size of their ownership positions matter. A smaller number of
studies address these questions.
Governments do not always fully privatize and evidence suggests that
performance is negatively related to their continued role in companies. Boubakri and
Cosset (1998) find that the performance improvement is greatest when governments
relinquish voting control. Majumdar (1998) echoes these conclusions. He studies the
performance of state-owned, privately-owned, and mixed-ownership companies in India
over the period 1973–1989 and finds that privately-owned firms exhibit greater efficiency
than state-owned or mixed-ownership firms and that mixed-ownership firms exhibit
greater efficiency than state-owned firms.
A number of studies address the relation between performance and the presence
of inside owners or foreign owners. Makhija and Spiro (2000) examine the share prices
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of 988 newly-privatized Czech firms and find that share prices are positively correlated
with foreign ownership and with ownership by insiders. Similar results are reported by
Hingorani and Makhija (1997), who conclude that insider and foreign ownership mitigate
agency problems through incentives that align the interests of managers and investors. In
a study of 506 privatized and state manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland in 1994, however, Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) find that
performance does not improve when ownership resides with corporate insiders, but does
improve when outside (i.e., non-employee) owners are introduced. Frydman, Pistor, and
Rapaczynski (1996) study the ability of Russian privatization investment funds to effect
change in the privatized Russian firms in which they invest.

They conclude that

domination by corporate insiders, particularly management, typically prevents the funds
from accomplishing meaningful change.
Claessens and Djankov (1999) report that the presence of a significant foreign
investor is associated with higher profitability in recently privatized Czech firms.
D’Souza, Megginson and Nash (2001) study 118 firms from 29 countries that were
privatized between 1961 and 1995.

They find that greater foreign ownership is

associated with greater efficiency gains post-privatization and that efficiency gains
increase as government ownership declines. They also report a negative relation between
employee ownership and profitability. Similarly, Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2001)
find that, in a study of 189 privatized firms in 32 developing countries, profitability and
efficiency gains are associated with the presence of a foreign owner. They caution,
however, that any positive effect of governance on value can only operate in an open
competitive economy with respect for private property rights. In a study of the prices of
privatized Mexican firms, Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) finds that prices are positively
correlated with the presence of a foreign investor and with turnover in the position of
CEO. In a study of 506 privatized and state manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland in 1994, Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) find that
performance does not improve when ownership resides with corporate insiders, but does
improve when outside (i.e., non-employee) owners are introduced.
There is some evidence that privatization is most valuable when it is results in
relatively concentrated private ownership.
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Claessens (1997) examines the mass

privatization and voucher distribution schemes of the Czechs and Slovak Republics in
1992 – 1993. Under this scheme, 1,491 private firms emerged from formerly state owned
enterprises.

For a relatively modest price, individual citizens could buy points (or

vouchers) with which to bid for these corporations. The companies were then sold
through a five-round auction. As the auction process evolved, investment companies
emerged that bought vouchers from individuals or individual could exchange their points
for shares in the investment companies. Investment companies ended up owning the
largest fraction of shares. Indeed, individuals directly held shares in only 168 companies.
Claessens regresses standardized share price against controls variables and various
measure of share ownership concentration. Both with prices from the original auction
and with secondary market prices, he reports that share prices are highly positively
correlated with ownership concentration. One interpretation is that dispersed ownership
among heterogeneous small shareholders leads to less effective management oversight in
firms that are newly privatized. In a later, more detailed, time series study of 706 newlyprivatized Czech firms, Claessens and Djankov (1999) find evidence consistent with
concentrated ownership leading to better performance in newly-privatized firms. In
particular, they report a positive correlation between ownership concentration and postprivatization profitability.
Megginson and Netter (2001) caution that there are numerous potential problems
in carrying out empirical privatization research, including bad data, lack of data, omitted
variables, endogeneity and selection bias.

Comparisons of state-owned to private

enterprises require appropriate benchmarks, which can be difficult to identify. With these
caveats in mind, however, the evidence to date from the empirical literature on
privatization implies that the identity of owners and the size of their positions does
influence firm performance. Ownership by insiders and by foreign investors is most
often associated with better performance, while ownership by the government is
associated with worse performance. There has been little or no evidence, however,
regarding other aspects of the governance structures of newly privatized companies, such
as board structure and executive compensation. Such firms, with their significant discrete
changes in governance structure, remain a fruitful area for international corporate
governance research.
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B.3. The Private Benefits of Control
Equity ownership provides holders with certain rights to the cash flows of the
firm.

To the extent that large shareholders have both the incentive to monitor

management and enough control to influence management such that cash flow is
increased, all shareholders of the firm benefit. These are the shared benefits of control.
Examination of the relation between equity ownership by blockholders and firm
performance is essentially measuring whether there are any shared benefits associated
with having large shareholders. However, there are potential private benefits of control
as well, private in that they are available only to those shareholders who have a
meaningful degree of control over the firm.
To the extent that control has value beyond the cash flow rights associated with
equity ownership, there is an incentive to hold disproportionate shares of control. There
are a number of ways in which shareholders can achieve control rights that exceed cash
flow rights in a given firm. In the US, this is most typically accomplished through
ownership of shares of common stock that carry disproportionately high numbers of
votes. Several studies examine firms that deviate from one share-one vote in the US and
find that superior voting shares trade at a small premium to inferior voting shares (See
Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983, 1984), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985),
Zingales (1995).)

Such evidence is consistent with there being private benefits of

control. Studies of voting share premiums around the world confirm the US evidence.
The premium is larger in all other countries that have been studied than in the US,
ranging from a low of 6.5% in Sweden (Rydkvist (1988)) to a high in Italy of 82%
(Zingales (1994)). One interesting exception to the general pattern is in a very small
sample of Mexican firms. Pinegar and Ravichandran (2003, this volume) examine firms
that have American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on each of two different classes of
common stock with differing voting rights. Of the ten pairs of so-called sibling ADRs
that they examine, five pairs are Mexican firms and for these five firms the superior
voting shares trade at a discount, on average, to the inferior voting shares. Further
analysis leads Pinegar and Ravichandran to conclude that control for these Mexican firms
has shifted to creditors and competitors, eroding equity voting premiums.
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Control in excess of proportional ownership can also be achieved through
pyramid structures or by cross-holdings. In a pyramid structure, one firm owns 51% (for
example) of a second firm, which owns 51% of a third firm, and so on. The owner at the
top of the pyramid thereby has effective control of all of the firms in the pyramid, with an
increasingly small investment in each firm down the line. Cross-holdings exist when a
group of companies maintain interlocking ownership positions in each other. To the
extent that the interlocking of their ownership positions makes group members inclined to
support each other, voting coalitions are formed.
Consolidation of control via dual share classes, pyramids, and cross-holdings are
common around the world. Claessens, Djankow, and Lang (2000) examine firms in nine
East Asian countries and find that voting rights frequently exceed cash flow rights,
typically via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The result is that in over two-thirds
of the firms in these countries there is a single shareholder that has effective control over
the firm. Faccio and Lang (2002) report that the use of dual class shares and pyramids to
enhance the control of the largest shareholders is common in western Europe, though the
resulting discrepancy between ownership and control is significant in only a few
countries. For Brazilian companies, Valadares and Leal (2000) document that the vast
majority of firms they study have some non-voting shares, while Lins (2003) finds that
pyramiding is common.
Group ownership structures are common in a number of countries. In Japan they
are termed keiretsu, in Korea chaebols, and in Russia financial-industrial groups. Groups
are also common in India, Italy, and Brazil. Kantor (1998) reports that South Africa is
dominated by five large groups – three of which are controlled by founders or their
families. These groups often have control of individual firms within the groups, despite
having made only minority cash flow investments in the firms.
In general, the international evidence indicates that the accumulation of control
rights in excess of cash flow rights reduces the observed market value of firms.

Lins

(2003, this volume) examines 18 emerging market countries and documents that the
uncoupling of control rights from cash flow rights is common and value-reducing.
Volpin (2002) reports that the sensitivity of top management turnover to performance in
Italy is lower when controlling shareholders own less than 50% of the cash flow rights.
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Nicodano (1998) finds that the voting premium in Italy is higher when there are business
groups involved. Lins and Servaes (1999) find that the diversification discount in Japan
is concentrated in firms that are part of industrial groups. Lins and Servaes (2002)
examine publicly-traded firms in seven emerging market countries and observe a
diversification discount only when firms belong to industrial groups or when
management ownership is in the 10-30% range. The discount is most severe when
management control rights substantially exceed their cash flow rights. Joh (2000) finds
in a sample of Korean firms that only those controlling blockholders that also have high
cash flow ownership are associated with higher firm profitability. He finds that firms
associated with business groups are less profitable overall. Gorton and Schmid (2000)
document that bank control in Germany has a positive effect on firm return on assets
when banks own the shares that they are voting, but has no impact on ROA when banks
are proxy voting shares held by others.
Several studies address the effect of membership in a group on investment
policies in companies within the group. In general, they find that investment is less
sensitive to cash flow for firms that belong to groups than for firms in the same country
that do not. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) find that Japanese firms with ties to
large banks have lower sensitivity of investment to liquidity. Shin and Park (1999) show
that investment by firms in Korean chaebols is less sensitive to firm cash flow than is
investment by non-chaebol Korean firms. Perotti and Gelfer (2001) document the same
for Russian firms that belong to financial-investment groups, particularly those led by
banks. While reliance on internal capital markets is not necessarily value-reducing,
evidence from the US implies that it more often does reduce value. Scharfstein (1998),
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), and Ahn and Denis (2002) present evidence
consistent with the hypothesis that diversified firms invest inefficiently, investing too
much in some business units or too little in others.
On a more positive note for group membership, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein
(1990) present evidence showing that keiretsu membership in Japan reduces the costs of
financial distress by mitigating the free-rider and information asymmetry problems that
make renegotiation with creditors difficult. Firms that belong to keiretsu, as well as non-
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keiretsu firms that have a strong tie to a main bank, invest more in productive assets and
maintain higher revenues in financial distress than do other Japanese firms.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the international literature on the
ownership of publicly-traded firms. First, ownership is, on average, significantly more
concentrated in non-US countries than it is in the US. Second, ownership structure
appears to matter more in non-US countries than it does in the US – i.e. it has a greater
impact on firm performance. Overall, private ownership concentration appears to have a
positive effect on firm value. Third, there are significant private benefits of control
around the world, and they are more significant for most non-US countries than they are
for the US. Structures that allow for control rights in excess of cash flow rights are
common, and generally value-reducing.

C. The External Control Market
A vast literature on the takeover market in the US indicates that it is an important
corporate governance mechanism, a ‘court of last resort’ for assets that are not being
utilized to their full potential. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) review this literature.
Several stylized facts stand out. Average announcement abnormal returns to target firm
shareholders are positive, while average abnormal returns to acquiring firm shareholders
are, at best insignificantly different from zero and are, in most studies, significantly
negative.

The combined abnormal returns to a target and acquiring firm pair are

relatively small, but significantly positive. Poorly-performing firms are more likely to be
targets of takeover attempts and the managers of poorly-performing firms are more likely
to be fired.
The takeover market in the UK is also active. Franks and Mayer (1996) examine
UK hostile takeovers and find that they are followed by high turnover among members of
the board of directors and significant restructuring. Target firms do not appear to be
performing poorly before the acquisition bids, however. Carline, Linn, and Yadav (2002)
document average increases in industry-adjusted operating performance following UK
mergers. Short and Keasey (1999) suggest that managers are less able to avoid being
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taken over in the UK than in the US due to the inability of UK managers to mount
takeover defenses.
Firth (1997) reports that New Zealand’s takeover market is relatively unregulated
and that there are a high number of takeovers relative to the size of the economy. The
evidence is largely consistent with that for the US: average positive returns to target firm
shareholders, average negative returns to acquiring firm shareholders, and an overall gain
for the combined firms. He also documents a positive relation between takeover returns
and the equity ownership of the acquiring firm’s directors.
Hostile takeover attempts in Germany have been rare, due presumably to the
significant ownership concentration that characterizes the equity market. However, a
number of authors present evidence that a German control market does exist, albeit one
that is different in form from that of the US and the UK. Jenkinson and Ljunqvist (2001)
assert that outsiders attempt to take control by seeking to acquire one or more blocks
from existing blockholders. Franks and Mayer (2001) confirm these findings. Other
evidence indicates that such changes in blockholder identity, and the turnover in board
members that typically accompany them, are more likely following poor performance.
(See Kaplan (1994), Franks and Mayer (2001), and Koke (2001).) Koke (2001) finds that
changes in the blockholders of German firms are followed by increased restructuring
activity, particularly management turnover, asset divestitures, and employee layoffs.
In general, takeover activity does not appear to be an important governance
mechanism around the world. Kabir, Cantrijn, and Jeunink (1997), for example, find that
hostile takeovers are relatively rare in the Netherlands, while Blass, Yafeh, and Yosha
(1998) indicate that there is only a very thin takeover market in Israel. Xu and Wang
(1997) indicate that there is no active takeover market in China. This general lack of
importance of takeovers is perhaps not surprising given the relatively high ownership
concentration in most other countries.
The first generation of international corporate governance research provides an
interesting look at governance in individual countries around the world. Some recent
work on international corporate governance is aimed at comparing governance systems
across countries.

The authors of these comparative governance studies examine

numerous countries in a unified framework, seeking to understand the factors that explain
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differences in corporate governance around the world. We review this literature in the
following section.

III. Second Generation International Corporate Governance
Research
The evidence discussed in section II indicates that block shareholders are more
common in most other countries of the world than in the US. In addition, the presence of
block shareholders is more likely to have a statistically significant effect on firm
performance in countries other than the US.

In general, the first generation of

international corporate governance research does not directly address the reasons for the
increased prevalence and impact of large shareholders outside of the US. There are,
however, some hints. For example, Zingales (1994) hypothesizes that the premium on
voting shares in Italy is so much larger than in other countries of the world because the
law does not adequately protect the rights of minority shareholders, giving whoever
controls a company greater scope to dilute minority shareholder rights.
Legal and regulatory issues play a relatively small role in the first generation of
international corporate governance research. U.S research involving these issues consists
primarily of studies involving some specific legal issues, e.g. state of incorporation and
state anti-takeover statutes.

The effects of the more general underlying system of

corporate laws and regulations on corporate governance and firm value are not generally
considered. This is perhaps not surprising, given that there can be little variability in
such factors in a sample made up entirely of US firms. In addition, some researchers
downplay the legal system as an effective means of corporate governance.
The research that we term second generation effectively begins with the work of
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV). In “Law and Finance” (1998)
they hypothesize that the extent to which a country’s laws protect investor rights – and
the extent to which those laws are enforced - are fundamental determinants of the ways in
which corporate finance and corporate governance evolve in that country.

Their

empirical evidence indicates that there are significant differences across countries in the
degree of investor protection, and that countries with low investor protection are
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generally characterized by high concentration of equity ownership within firms and a lack
of significant public equity markets. LLSV measure ownership concentration in each
country by computing the total percentage equity ownership of the three largest
shareholders for each of the ten largest domestic, non-financial firms in the country. The
median figure for the 49 countries in the sample is 45%. The US figure of 20% is the
lowest in the sample; only six countries are under 30%. LLSV assign each of the 49
countries to one of four general groups:

common law countries, French civil law

countries, German civil law countries, and Scandinavian civil law countries. They find
that the laws in common law countries provide the strongest degree of protection for
shareholders, while the laws in French civil law countries provide the least protection.
Enforcement of the laws is stronger in the German and Scandinavian law countries than
in the common law countries, with the weakest enforcement observed in French civil law
countries.
Concentrated ownership may be a reasonable response to a lack of investor
protection. If the law does not protect the owners from the controllers, the owners will
seek to be controllers. LLSV (1998) point out that, in this situation, the agency conflict
between managers and shareholders – the primary conflict around which most of the US
corporate governance research has revolved - is not meaningful because large
shareholders have both the incentive and the ability to control management. LLSV
suggest, however, that highly concentrated ownership leads to an equity agency conflict
between dominant shareholders and minority shareholders.
In addition to their insight about the agency problems between large and small
shareholders, LLSV provide international corporate governance researchers with
important data by developing objective measures of investor protection for each of the 49
countries in their samples. These overall scores are made up of variables related to
specific shareholder and creditor rights, which measure the protection afforded by the
law, and variables related to the rule of law, which measure the degree to which the
existing laws are enforced. The variability in legal structures around the world – and the
ability to measure it – provide greater opportunities for comparative corporate
governance studies.
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A. Legal Protection and Economic Growth
One branch of the existing literature on the effects of legal systems on economies
and on the firms within them is concerned with their effects on the availability of external
finance and, therefore, on economic growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) hypothesize that
financial development facilitates economic growth. Consistent with this, they find that
industrial sectors that need more external finance develop disproportionately faster in
countries that have more developed financial markets.

Wurgler (2000) examines

investment by firms in 65 countries. Using the size of stock and credit markets relative to
GDP as a proxy for financial development, he finds that firms in countries with
developed financial sectors increase investment more in growing industries and decrease
it more in declining industries.
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) hypothesize that better
legal protection leads investors to demand lower expected rates of return and that
companies, in turn, are more likely to use external finance when rates are lower. They
compute three aggregate measures of the use of external finance and find that all three
measures are highest in common law countries, where investor protection is greatest, and
lowest in French civil law countries, where investor protection is weakest. Regression
analysis indicates that the use of equity finance is positively related to shareholder rights.
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) examine firms in 40 countries and document
that the development of a country’s legal system predicts firms’ access to external
finance.
Giannetti (2003, this volume) examines the effect of creditor rights and the degree
to which they are enforced on the availability and use of debt for firms in eight European
countries. She focuses primarily on unlisted firms, suggesting that their lack of access to
international markets makes them more subject to the constraints imposed by their own
domestic markets. Giannetti finds that the ability of her sample firms to obtain loans for
investment in intangible assets is positively related to the level of protection of creditor
rights and the degree to which these rights are enforced; the same is true for access to
long-term debt for firms operating in sectors with highly volatile returns.
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2002) hypothesize that lack of investor
protection forces company insiders to hold higher fractions of the equity of the firms they
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manage. These high holdings subject insiders to high levels of idiosyncratic risk, which,
in turn, increases the risk premium and, therefore, the marginal cost of capital.
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love find results consistent with their hypotheses for firms in
38 countries.

They document a negative relation between the degree of investor

protection and the fraction of equity held by insiders, and a positive correlation between
inside equity ownership and the marginal return to capital.
Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) provide evidence that the degree of
investor protection in a country also affects the way in which that economy’s capital
markets respond to adversity. They examine 25 countries during the Asian crisis of
1997-1998 and find that the magnitude of decline in the stock market and the degree of
depreciation of the exchange rate are negatively related to the degree of investor
protection.
The results detailed above imply that strong economic growth requires developed
financial markets and that strong investor protection is necessary if strong financial
markets are to develop. Thus, studies indicate that investor protection laws and the
degree to which they are enforced affect the size and extent of countries’ capital markets
and, with them, the level of economic growth.
The positive effects of investor protection on economies are echoed for the
individual firms within them. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000)
find that firms in common law countries where investor protection is stronger make
higher dividend payouts when firm reinvestment opportunities are poor than do firms in
countries with weak legal protection. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003, this
volume) report that firms in countries with strong legal protection are less likely to
maintain excess cash balances. They reject the possibility that their results are driven by
the difficulty of raising needed external capital for firms in countries where investor
protection is weak. Thus, the agency costs associated with free cash flow appear to be
lower in countries with stronger investor protection. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (2002) find that firms in countries with better investor protection have higher
Tobin’s Q ratios.

Gul and Qiu (2002) relate LLSV’s legal protection measures to

information asymmetry for 22 emerging market countries, measuring information
asymmetry based on the degree of importance that investors place on current versus
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future earnings. Their results indicate that greater legal protection is associated with
lower levels of information asymmetry and, therefore, with less serious agency problems.
The relation between investor protection and financial systems has implications
for the design of other aspects of governance.

John and Kedia (2002) model the

interactions between ownership structure, debt structure, and the external control market.
Their model implies that optimal governance systems are, in part, functions of the degree
of development of financial institutions and markets. There is evidence that individual
firms within an economy do sometimes structure their own governance to overcome the
deleterious effects that the lack of investor protection in their economy has on their
ability to raise external capital.

Durnev and Kim (2002) examine the quality of

individual firm governance for firms in 26 countries using corporate governance scores
compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia and Standard and Poor’s. These scores are
assigned based on a wide variety of firm characteristics, including characteristics related
to disclosure, board structure, ownership structure, and accountability. Durnev and Kim
find that the quality of governance in individual firms varies greatly within countries; in
particular, firms with better investment opportunities and firms that rely more on external
finance have higher governance scores. Durnev and Kim also find that these firms are
valued more highly. Klapper and Love (2002) examine firm-level corporate governance
characteristics for emerging market firms and find that these characteristics matter more
in countries that have weak investor protection.
There is evidence, however, that without underlying legal protection, individual
company governance structures put into place when capital is needed to take advantage
of investment opportunties do not necessarily survive when such opportunities disappear.
Lemmon and Lins (2003) examine the response of firms in eight East Asian countries to
the Asian financial crisis.

They find that Tobin’s Q falls further and stock price

performance is worse for those firms in which minority shareholders are potentially more
subject to expropriation. They conclude that ownership structure may be especially
important in times of declining investment opportunities. Consistent with this, Mitton
(2002) reports that East Asian firms that had higher outside ownership concentration
experienced significantly better stock price performance during the crisis.
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Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo (2003, this volume) present evidence on another
means by which firms may be able to partially compensate for the negative effect of poor
investor protection on the availability of finance.

They analyze the effect of

diversification on value for a sample of more than 8,000 companies from 35 countries.
They find that diversification has a more positive (less negative) effect on value for firms
in countries with weaker investor protection and suggest that one interpretation of their
results is that the internal capital market created by diversification is more valuable in
countries in which investor protection is poor and external capital is less available.
Coffee (2001) suggests that social norms may also be an important determinant of
the extent to which those in control of the firm take advantage of minority investors. He
notes that the Scandinavian legal systems are considered to be relatively strong, despite
the fact that they are more like other civil legal systems than they are like common law
systems. He points out that Scandinavian countries have very low crime rates and
hypothesizes that social norms in Scandinavia may discourage expropriation of minority
investors. The fact that such expropriation is relatively low in the US, despite its high
crime rate, leads Coffee to suggest the possibility that law and social norms are
intertwined. In particular, he hypothesizes that the impact of social norms may be
greatest when law is the weakest.
The first generation of international corporate governance reviewed in section II
establishes that equity ownership within firms is much more concentrated in most
countries of the world than it is in the US, and that this ownership concentration tends to
have a positive effect on firm value. The results above offer an explanation for both
findings – concentrated ownership is a rational and valuable response to a system that
does not protect minority investors.6 LLSV (1998), however, point out that there are
costs to concentrated ownership as well; namely the potential agency conflicts between
large shareholders and minority investors.
6

Esty and Megginson (2003, this volume) examine the impact of countries’ creditor rights on the
concentration of debt ownership in firms by analyzing 495 project finance loan tranches granted to
borrowers in 61 different countries. In an interesting contrast to the results regarding equity ownership
concentration, Esty and Megginson find that loan syndicates’ average response to weaker creditor rights
and poor enforcement of rights is to decrease debt ownership concentration. Because a larger number of
creditors makes re-contracting more difficult, Esty and Megginson interpret their results as evidence that
banks faced with weak protection of their creditor-rights see deterring strategic defaults as their primary
governance role.
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B.

Control vs. Ownership: The Private Benefits of Control
If large shareholders benefit only from proportionate cash dividends and

appreciation in the market value of their shares there is no conflict between large
shareholders and minority shareholders. The evidence in section II, however, establishes
that there can also be private benefits of control. Furthermore, the existence of such
benefits leads investors in many countries to seek control rights that exceed their cash
flow rights. While concentrated ownership is more often associated with increased value,
control rights in excess of cash flow rights tend to be value-reducing.
Dyck and Zingales (2002) measure the private benefits of control using the
differences between the premiums for voting and non-voting shares for block control
transactions in 39 countries. Like previous researchers, they find that private benefits
vary greatly around the world and that they are quite significant in some countries. More
importantly, they find that the individual voting premiums are negatively related to the
degree of investor protection in the country; i.e. in countries where investors are less well
protected by law, controlling shareholders can and do extract larger private benefits of
control. Nenova (2003) studies 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries, using data for 1997.
She isolates control benefits and vote values from stock prices and estimates that the
private benefits that controlling shareholders extract from their control range from 0% of
firm value in Denmark to 50% of firm value in Mexico. Nenova further finds that
variables related to the legal environment explain 75% of the cross-country variation in
the value of control benefits.
The second generation international corporate governance literature identifies at
least two important ways in which controlling shareholders extract value from the firm.
The first is termed tunnelling, defined by Johnson, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2000) as transfers of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who
control them. They suggest that there are numerous ways in which tunneling can occur,
that it happens even in developed economies, and that it is more likely to occur in civil
law countries than in common law countries.
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Tunnelling is prevalent in firms in which excess control rights are achieved by
pyramid ownership structures. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) examine
27 wealthy economies and find that pyramids are the most common method by which
controlling shareholders achieve control rights that exceed their cash flow rights. Recall
that, in a pyramid structure, one entity owns a controlling interest in a chain of firms in
such a way that the controlling shareholder of the firm at the top of the pyramid achieves
effective control of all of the subsidiaries down the line, while actually owning an ever
smaller portion of each firm. The controlling shareholder can extract value from the
firms that are farther down the line by transferring resources of those lower-level
companies to the firms that are higher in the pyramid. This can be done in a variety of
ways, e.g. by selling goods from higher-level firms to lower-level firms at inflated prices,
or by selling goods from lower-level firms to higher-level firms at below-market prices.
Control of a firm also allows the controller to choose who the managers will be.
Burkhart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) develop a model in which they assume that a
professional manager is more capable of managing a company well than is an heir to the
founder. Their model predicts that the equilibrium in legal regimes that protect minority
investors will be widely-held firms managed by professional managers, while weakshareholder-protection regimes will tend to have family ownership with heir as managers.
Several authors present evidence that controlling shareholders – or their family members
- often manage the firms they control. Claessens, Djankow, and Lang (2000) find this to
be true for nine East Asian countries, while Lins (2003, this volume) documents the same
in his sample of firms from 18 emerging market countries. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) find for 27 wealthy economies that controlling shareholders
usually participate in management.
Of course, installing family members as managers is not harmful to minority
shareholders if the managers installed are the best possible people to operate the firm.
What evidence exists, however, demonstrates that this is not the case. The evidence in a
number of US studies indicates that CEOs that are family members are more entrenched
and more likely to detract from performance. For example, Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan,
and Newman (1985) document a positive stock price response to the sudden deaths of
founding chief exeutives; this result does not hold for non-founder chief executives.
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Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that, among older firms, Tobin’s Q is lower
when firms are managed by members of the founding family than when they are managed
by unrelated officers.

Volpin (2002) finds that the sensitivity of top management

turnover to Tobin’s Q in Italy is lowest when controlling shareholders are the managers,
when control is fully in the hands of one shareholder, and when controlling shareholders
own less than 50% of the cash flow rights.
There is currently conflicting evidence on whether the problems associated with
the presence of a controlling shareholder are alleviated by also having a large nonmanagement shareholder. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) indicate that it
does not help for their sample of firms from 27 wealthy countries. Lins (2003, this
volume), however, finds that outside blockholders reduce the valuation discount
associated with managerial agency problems for firms from 18 emerging market
countries.
Based upon currently existing second generation research, legal structure – in
particular the degree to which investors rights are protected – is important to the
development of financial markets and to the structure of governance within firms around
the world. The evidence discussed in section II indicates that equity ownership structure
has a stronger relation to performance and value in non-US countries than it does in the
US. The results presented in this section offer a possible interpretation of this finding.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) hypothesize that ownership is endogenous; i.e. firms will adopt
the ownership structure that is most appropriate given the characteristics of the firm. If
this is true, the uncertain relation between ownership and performance in the US may not
suggest that ownership does not matter – only that different ownership structures are
most appropriate for different firms. Under this view, the more significant relation
between ownership and performance in some other countries in the world may stem from
their weaker legal systems. In other words, without strong protection of investor rights,
firms do not have the luxury of developing optimal firm-specific governance systems.
Concentrated ownership is a necessity, despite the fact that it creates its own set of
problems. Consistent with this, Lins (2003, this volume) finds stronger positive relations
between ownership and performance in countries with less legal protection and Durnev

36

and Kim (2002) find that relations between governance quality scores and Tobin’s Q are
stronger in countries that are less investor friendly.
Do these results suggest that concentrated ownership is suboptimal in an overall
sense, that its incidence would be greatly reduced if legal systems the world over
provided strong protection of investors? Would corporate governance systems converge
in such an environment? Are they converging in the current environment – and, if so,
towards what are they converging? We turn to these questions in the following section.

IV. Convergence in Corporate Governance Systems
For as long as we have recognized fundamental differences in corporate
governance systems across countries, there has been debate about which system is ‘best.’
Because the earliest non-US evidence was from Germany, Japan, and the UK, the early
debate centered around these countries and compared the bank-centered governance
systems of Germany and Japan to the market-centered governance systems of the US and
the UK. During the 1990s, the system of governance in Japan was compared favorably to
that of the US. While the US system was heavily market-based, the Japanese system was
more relationship-based. Proponents of the Japanese system characterized it as a superior
substitute for the external control market, one in which managers were less subject to
short-term pressures from the market.

Critics, however, argued that the system

entrenched managers, potentially protecting them from the value-increasing discipline of
the market.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assert that good corporate governance systems are
rooted in an appropriate combination of legal protection of investors and some form of
concentrated ownership. The US and UK systems rely somewhat more heavily on
stronger legal protection, while the German and Japanese systems are characterized by
weaker legal protection but more concentrated equity ownership. Shleifer and Vishny
downplay the debate about the corporate governance systems of these particular countries
and characterize all four of them as having good corporate governance systems.
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As corporate governance evidence from countries other than the ‘big four’ has
grown in volume, the scope of the debate has expanded as well. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) argue that other countries of the world lack the necessary legal protection to
develop good corporate governance systems. In other words, while there is some room
for variation in legal protection, there is a reservation level of legal protection that is
required if an economy is to have an effective corporate governance system – and this
reservation level is not met in many of the world’s economies. Rajan and Zingales
(2000) hypothesize that, while a relationship-based system of corporate governance can
overcome some of the problems associated with the lack of investor protection, the longrun ability of firms to raise capital and allocate it efficiently will be better served by a
market-based system. They emphasize that a market-based system can only be effective
with transparency and strong legal protection of investors. Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram,
and Walsh (1999) stress that a contractarian system of governance, such as that observed
in the US, allows for greater flexibility and, therefore, allows firms to better adapt to
dramatic changes. They cite the important role of law in dealing with aspects of the
modern corporation that cannot be completely contracted upon.
It is likely that an evolution towards stronger legal protection for investors in
many countries would lead to improved corporate governance systems and greater
economic development.

What is less clear is the likelihood of such an evolution

occurring. Coffee (1999) hypothesizes that corporate evolution is likely to follow the
path of least resistance and that evolution in corporate laws faces too many obstacles to
be predicted. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Bebchuk and Roe
(1999) conjecture that the controlling shareholders of the world will fight to protect the
private benefits of control that accompany their concentrated equity ownership.
Attempts to improve laws protecting minority shareholders clearly threaten those private
benefits of control. To the extent that controlling shareholders are influential people
within economies, convergence to legal systems that are more protective of minority
investor rights will be difficult. Stronger laws will expropriate value from controlling
shareholders; thus, controlling shareholders will demand to be compensated for their
losses.
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Because the large number of changes in laws that are needed to bring about legal
convergence are likely to be politically difficult, Coffee (1999) and LaPorta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) put more store in what they term functional
convergence. Functional convergence occurs when individual investors or firms adapt in
ways that create stronger governance, despite a lack of appropriate legal structure. For
example, investors can opt to invest their money in firms that are domiciled in more
investor-friendly regimes.

Firms in less protective regimes can bond themselves to

practice better corporate governance by listing on exchanges in more protective regimes
or by being acquired by firms in more protective regimes. Coffee points to the significant
number of Israeli firm that have effected their initial public offerings on NASDAQ in the
US. Reese and Weisbach (2002) present evidence indicating that foreign firms that list in
the US do so to protect shareholder rights. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2001) examine
firms at year-end 1997 and find that foreign companies listed in the US have greater
Tobin’s Q ratios than do firms from the same countries that are not listed in the US.
They hypothesize that the firms that list in the US are better able to take advantage of
growth opportunities and that their controlling shareholders cannot extract as many
private benefits of control. Bris and Cabolis (2002) document that the Tobin’s Q of an
industry typically increases when firms in that industry are acquired by firms domiciled
in countries that have stronger corporate governance systems.
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argue that there is a strong likelihood of
convergence towards a single governance model. They assert that the basic corporate
form has already achieved a great deal of uniformity; i.e. that economies are approaching
a world-wide consensus that managers should act in the interests of shareholders and that
this should include all shareholders, whether controlling or non-controlling. They believe
that there are three principal factors driving economies towards consensus: the failure of
alternative models, the competitive pressures of global commerce, and the shift of interest
group influence in favor of an emerging shareholder class. They acknowledge that
convergence in corporate law proceeds more slowly than convergence in governance
practices; however they expect that the pressure for convergence in law will be strong
and ultimately successful.
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Perotti and von Thadden (2003, this volume) stress the role of transparency in any
convergence to a market-oriented system of governance. They hypothesize that lenders
have less desire for transparency than do equity holders. Perotti and von Thadden
believe, however, that increases in financial integration and product market competition
around the world are likely to increase the returns to information gathering, thereby
generating greater information revelation. Ultimately, this process will lead to reduced
influence by banks and a convergence towards market-oriented financial systems.
What about convergence in corporate governance mechanisms other than the legal
system? There is evidence of convergence in a number of areas. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) and Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) report that governance systems in Germany,
Japan, and the US show signs of convergence towards each other. Large shareholders are
on the increase in US firms, while board structure in Germany and Japan are moving
more toward the US model of a single-tier board that is relatively small and has both
insiders and a meaningful number of outsiders. Wojcik (2001) examines changes in
ownership structure in German firms over the period from 1997 through 2001. He
reports that the level of ownership concentration fell significantly over this period, that
cross-holdings began to dissolve, and that financial sector institutions declined in
importance as blockholders. He concludes that German firms are, on average, moving
towards the Anglo-Saxon system. The significant incidence of privatizations around the
world represents a move towards the private ownership that characterizes the major
economies of the world.
Codes of Best Practice around the world are consistent with convergence towards
an Anglo-Saxon governance structure. As discussed earlier, Dahya, McConnell, and
Travlos (2002) and Dahya and McConnell (2002) report evidence of significant changes
in board structure in the UK following code adoption there. However, evidence from
some other countries is less favorable. Bianchi and Enriques (1999) report that attempts
by the Italian government to increase protection of minority shareholders by fostering
greater activism by institutional investors have not been successful. DeJong, DeJong,
Mertens, and Wasley (2002) study firms in the Netherlands following a private sector
initiative to promote change in the balance of power between management and investors.
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They find no substantive effect on corporate governance characteristics or on the
relations between these characteristics and corporate value.
Liu (2001) reports that securities laws in Taiwan and China are increasingly
influenced by the American common law model. In China such laws are meant to reduce
asset stripping by directors and managers of state-owned companies, while in Taiwan it is
minority expropriation by founders of family-controlled listed companies that the
government wishes to curb.
In a more comprehensive study, Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2002) analyze 37
countries to determine whether globalization is leading firms to adopt a common set of
the most efficient governance practices.

They find de jure convergence – i.e.

convergence in law - at the country level. Rather than converging towards any single
system, however, they find convergence between various pairs of economically
interdependent countries.

They find no evidence of de facto convergence – i.e.

convergence in practice. They conclude that globalization has induced adoption of some
common corporate governance recommendations but that these recommendations are not
being widely implemented.
Time will tell what the bottom line on the convergence of corporate governance
systems around the world will be. Presumably market forces will affect the extent to
which convergence occurs; however market forces are not allowed to operate unimpeded
throughout the world. Convergence towards stronger legal protection of investors is
likely to result in increased investment and growth; however, it is not clear whether or
how quickly such convergence will occur. Convergence in other aspects of corporate
governance – such as board composition and ownership structure – are evident in some
places. Broad convergence may be hampered by the fact that there is not yet agreement
on the factors that determine the optimal structures for individual firms.

V.

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
The literature on international corporate governance tells us much about corporate

governance but the message in the information is far from clear or complete. Much more
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work remains to be done. Our understanding of the relationship between systems of
governance and the value of economies and the firms within them is of increasing
importance as emerging markets around the world look to the developed markets to
decide how to set up their own economic and corporate governance systems.
In this paper we review existing international corporate governance research. The
first generation of this research is broadly patterned after the large body of evidence on
governance mechanisms in US firms. These first generation studies examine governance
mechanisms that have been studied in the US – particularly board composition and
ownership structure – for one or more non-US countries.
The first generation of international corporate governance research examines
individual countries in depth and establishes that there are important differences in
governance systems across economies. Early international research focused primarily on
Germany, Japan, and the UK. Even across these very developed economies, significant
differences in ownership and board structure were observed. As international research
expanded into other countries, the differences in corporate governance systems mounted.
Of particular note are the very distinct differences in ownership structure across
countries. The typical large US corporation, with its diffuse equity ownership structure
and its professional manager, appears to be typical only of the US and the UK.
Ownership concentration in virtually every other country in the world is higher than it is
in these two countries. In many countries, majority ownership by a single shareholder is
common.
It is also common in many countries that major shareholders’ control rights
exceed their cash flow rights. The realities of ownership and control are such that the
primary agency conflict in the US – that between professional managers and their widely
dispersed shareholders – is relatively unimportant in many other countries. In its place,
however, there is a different agency conflict, that between controlling shareholders and
minority shareholders.

Evidence suggests that the private benefits of control of

companies can be significant and that they are value-reducing.
The typical first-generation international corporate governance study examines
one particular country. Taken together, these studies reveal differences in governance
systems across countries. Such a fragmented approach, however, does not yield much
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understanding of why we observe the differences we do. To be able to explain these
differences, examination of many countries in a unified framework is required. This task
is taken up in the second generation of international corporate governance research.
An important insight generated from the second generation research is that a
country’s legal system – in particular, the extent to which it protects investor rights – has
a fundamental effect on the structure of markets in that country, on the governance
structures that are adopted by companies in that country, and on the effectiveness of those
governance systems. This insight, along with newly-developed measures of the strength
of countries’ legal protection of investors, will continue to generate a rich body of
comparative corporate governance studies.
Strong legal protection for shareholders appears to be a necessary condition for
diffuse equity investment.

The relatively diverse ownership of US firms can be

attributed, at least in part to the relatively strong legal protection available to potential
investors in the US. The general lack of a relationship between ownership structure and
firm value could simply mean that the strong legal protection in the US allows US firms
to pick and choose among a menu of potential governance mechanisms to achieve
optimal structures. In countries with weak protection, however, it appears that only
ownership concentration can overcome the lack of protection.
While there is a large body of evidence on individual corporate governance
mechanisms in the US, there is much less published evidence addressing the
interrelationships among them and the factors that determine the optimal governance
structure for a particular firm. In addition, the recent evidence on the importance of legal
structure poses new questions even for the US. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998) argue that, while protection of shareholder rights in the US is the strongest
in the world, such protection is not particularly strong anywhere.

Would greater

protection in the US improve corporate governance, and with it firm values? Clearly
there are limits to the value of protection. For example, a system in which shareholders
have the right to approve or disapprove every decision made by managers would be
neither practical nor valuable. But what are these limits? Does the US have an optimal
level of shareholder protection, or is there room for improvement?
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Governance structures around the world are evolving, as governments, private
parties, and markets seek to strengthen their economies and firms. Such evolution will
provide opportunities for rich new data. For many countries in the world, there is
relatively little empirical evidence on governance mechanisms other than legal protection
and ownership structure. Such issues as board structure, compensation, and changes in
control have been extensively studied in the US but have been studied much less – if at
all – for many other world economies. This may reflect the dominant role of ownership
structure in these economies, a dominance that appears to be driven at least in part by
weaknesses in legal systems. Evolutions in legal structure provide for natural corporate
governance experiments. What aspects of legal systems evolve? What are the effects of
such changes on the role of other firm-specific governance mechanisms?

What,

ultimately, are the effects of such changes on the strength of economies and on the
actions and value of companies within them? Answers to these questions will increase
our understanding of the role of corporate governance throughout the world.
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